



RE Future

Brewster Wind Farm

Application for Planning Permit

Appendix K – Aviation Lighting Risk Assessment

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LIGHTING RISK ASSESSMENT

BREWSTER WIND FARM

Prepared for RE Future Pty Ltd

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ACRONYMS

AAAA	Aerial Agricultural Association of Australia
AC	Advisory Circular
AGL	above ground level
AHD	Australian Height Datum
AIA	aviation impact assessment
AIP	Aeronautical Information Package
AIS	aviation impact statement
ALA	aircraft landing area
ALARP	as low as reasonably practicable
AMSL	above mean sea level
ARP	Aerodrome Reference Point
AS	Australian Standards
AsA	Airservices Australia
ATSB	Australian Transport Safety Bureau
CAO	Civil Aviation Orders
CAR	Civil Aviation Regulation (1988)
CASA	Civil Aviation Safety Authority
CASR	Civil Aviation Safety Regulation (1998)
CFIT	controlled flight into terrain
CNS	communications, navigation and surveillance
DAH	Designated Airspace Handbook
EIS	environmental impact statement
ERC-H	en-route chart high
ERC-L	en-route chart low
ERSA	En Route Supplement Australia
GA	general aviation
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IFR	instrument flight rules
IMC	instrument meteorological conditions
LSALT	lowest safe altitude

MOC	minimum obstacle clearance
MOS	Manual of Standards
MSA	minimum sector altitude
NASAG	National Airports Safeguarding Advisory Group
NASF	National Airports Safeguarding Framework
OLS	obstacle limitation surface
PANS-OPS	Procedures for Air Navigation Services - Aircraft Operations
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RFDS	Royal Flying Doctor Service
RSR	route surveillance radar
SSR	secondary surveillance radar
VFR	visual flight rules
VMC	visual meteorological conditions
WMTs	wind monitoring towers
WTGs	wind turbine generators

UNITS OF MEASUREMENT

ft	feet	(1 ft = 0.3048 m)
km	kilometres	(1 km = 0.5399 nm)
m	metres	(1 m = 3.281 ft)
nm	nautical miles	(1 nm = 1.852 km)

DEFINITIONS

Definitions of key aviation terms are included in **Annexure 2**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

RE Future is developing the Brewster Wind Farm located between Ballarat and Beaufort, in central west Victoria.

The development consists of 6 wind turbine generators (WTG) with a maximum height of 252 m AGL for the blade tips. A Wind Monitoring Tower (WMT), with a maximum height of 140 m AGL is located centrally in the proposed wind farm.

An Aviation Impact Assessment (AIA) was updated in June 2024. It assessed the potential aviation impacts, provided aviation safety advice in respect of relevant requirements of air safety regulations and procedures.

RE Future has contracted Aviation Projects to conduct a qualitative risk assessment to determine the need for obstacle lighting.

Obstacle lighting risk assessment

Aviation Projects has undertaken a safety risk assessment of the Project and concludes that WTGs and temporary/permanent WMTs that are installed in close proximity to a constructed WTG will not require obstacle lighting to maintain an acceptable level of safety to aircraft.

Lighting of WTGs

Aviation Projects has assessed that the Project will not require obstacle lighting to maintain an acceptable level of safety to aircraft.

Marking of wind monitoring towers

Consideration should be given to marking the WMT according to the guidance provided in NASF Guideline D) and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) Advisory Circular (AC) 139.E-05 v1.1 *Obstacles (including wind farms) outside the vicinity of a CASA certified aerodrome*, dated October 2022.

Specifically:

- marker balls or high visibility flags or high visibility sleeves should be placed on the outside guy wires
- paint markings should be applied in alternating contrasting bands of colour to at least the top 1/3 of the mast
- ensuring the guy wire ground attachment points have contrasting colours to the surrounding ground/vegetation.

Lighting of wind monitoring towers

Consideration should be given to lighting temporary WMTs, higher than 150 m AGL, installed prior to WTG installation and WMTs that are not in close proximity to a WTG with medium intensity steady red obstacle lighting at the top of the WMT mast. Characteristics for medium-intensity obstacle lighting are contained in MOS 139, Section 9.33.

In the case of the Brewster Wind Farm's WMT at a height of 140 m AGL will not require obstacle lighting to maintain an acceptable level of safety to aircraft.

Triggers for review

1. Triggers for review of this risk assessment are provided for consideration:
 - a. prior to construction to ensure the regulatory framework has not changed
 - b. following any significant changes to the context in which the assessment was prepared, including the regulatory framework
 - c. following any near miss, incident or accident associated with operations considered in this risk assessment.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Situation

RE Future is developing the Brewster Wind Farm located between Ballarat and Beaufort, in central west Victoria.

The development consists of 6 wind turbine generators (WTG) with a maximum height of 252 m AGL for the blade tips.

A Wind Monitoring Tower, with a maximum height of 140 m AGL is located centrally on the proposed wind farm.

An Aviation Impact Assessment (AIA) was finalised in August 2021 and updated in June 2024 with a reduced number of WTGs, but at a slightly higher maximum height AGL. It assessed the potential aviation impacts, provided aviation safety advice in respect of relevant requirements of air safety regulations and procedures.

RE Future has contracted Aviation Projects to conduct an updated qualitative risk assessment to determine the need for obstacle lighting.

1.2. Scope and Methodology

Aviation Projects has:

- Reviewed the LB00396 Aviation Impact Assessment dated 20 August 2021 and updated report in June 2024, to confirm wind farm location, local aviation activity and overall accuracy of this report
- Conducted an aviation risk assessment in relation to the provision of obstacle lighting on the WTGs and WMT
- Provided a report that demonstrates the level of risk in not lighting Brewster WTGs and WMT. This report will support a request to Planning Victoria in relation to obstacle lighting on the WTGs.
- Finalise the AIA report for client acceptance when responses received from stakeholders for client review and acceptance.

1.3. Material reviewed

Material provided by the Proponent for preparation of this assessment include:

- 20211113 BRE LB00396 AIA Brewster Wind Farm Final V8 20 August 2021
- 20240424 BRE WTG. Shp.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1. Site overview

The Project site is located approximately 24 km west of Ballarat in Victoria and approximately 7 km northeast of the Beaufort ALA at Neering.

An overview of the Project site relative to Ballarat and Beaufort in Victoria is provided in Figure 1 (source: RE Future, Google Earth).



Figure 1 Project site location overview

2.2. Project Description

The development consists of 6 wind turbine generators (WTG) with a maximum height of 252 m AGL for the blade tips. The highest WTG (# 3) within the wind farm will be 641.14 m AHD / 2103.5 ft AMSL.

A WMT with a maximum height of 140 m AGL will be located centrally on the proposed wind farm.

Figure 2 shows the project layout.



Figure 2 Brewster Wind farm layout

2.3. Airspace

The instrument approach procedures at Ballarat Airport have been amended since the AIA was completed in 2021.

The only relevant change is an increase to the minimum altitude associated with the 25 nm Minimum Safe Altitude (25 MSA). It has been increased from 3100 ft to 3200 ft with the associated protection altitude now being at 2200 ft AMSL. The WTGs at a height of 2103.5 ft AMSL remain below the lowest altitude and do not affect IFR aircraft operations in the area.

The air routes and the Grid lowest safe altitudes remain unchanged and are not infringed.

3. HAZARD LIGHTING AND MARKING

Based on the risk assessment set out in Section 5, it is concluded that aviation lighting is not required for WTGs or for the WMT.

Once the details of the wind farm, along with this report, are provided by the planning authority to CASA, they will determine whether the wind farm creates a hazard to aviation safety in the area.

The Aviation Projects obstacle lighting risk assessment should also be assessed by CASA.

Aviation Projects has determined that the non-provision of obstacle lighting on the WTGs will maintain an acceptable level of aviation safety risk associated with the potential for an aircraft collision with the wind farm.

3.1. Wind monitoring towers (WMTs)

The WMT is free-standing and not surrounded by any other obstacles. Therefore, the proposed WMT should be marked as per the content of NASF Guideline D. WTGs have not been constructed as yet.

In terms of obstacle marking and lighting requirements, relevant requirements set out in CASR Part 139 Manual of Standards, CASA AC-139.E-05 and NASF Guideline D are provided below.

3.1.1. CASR Part 139

Consideration must be given to marking the WMTs according to the requirements set out in MOS 139 Chapter 8 Division 10 Obstacle Markings, specifically:

8.109 Obstacles and hazardous obstacles

(1) The following objects or structures at an aerodrome are obstacles and must be marked in accordance with this Division unless CASA determines otherwise under subsections (3) and (5):

any fixed object or structure, whether temporary or permanent in nature, extending above the obstacle limitation surfaces. Note an ILS building is an example of a fixed object;

any object or structure on or above the movement area that is removable and is not immediately removed.

8.110 Marking of hazardous obstacles

(5) long, narrow structures like masts, poles and towers which are hazardous obstacles must be marked in contrasting colour bands so that:

(a) the darker colour is at the top; and

(b) the bands:

i. are, as far as physically possible, marked at right angles along the length of the long, narrow structure; and

ii. have a length ("z" in Figure 8.110 (5)) that is, approximately, the lesser of:

(A) 1/7 of the height of the structure; or

(B) 30 m.

(7) Hazardous obstacles in the form of wires or cables must be marked using 3-dimensional coloured objects attached to the wire or cables. Note: Spheres and pyramids are examples of 3-dimensional objects.

(8) The objects mentioned in subsection (7) must:

- (a) be approximately equivalent in size to a cube with 600 mm sides; and
- (b) be spaced 30 m apart along the length of the wire or cable.

Characteristics of medium-intensity lights are specified in MOS 139 Section 9.33:

- 1) Medium-intensity obstacle lights must:
 - a) be visible in all directions in azimuth; and
 - b) if flashing — have a flash frequency of between 20 and 60 flashes per minute.
- 2) The peak effective intensity of medium-intensity obstacle lights must be $2\,000 \pm 25\%$ cd with a vertical distribution as follows:
 - a) for vertical beam spread — a minimum of 3 degrees;
 - b) at -1 degree elevation — a minimum of 50% of the lower tolerance value of the peak intensity;
 - c) at 0 degrees elevation — a minimum of 100% of the lower tolerance value of the peak intensity.
- 3) For subsection (2), vertical beam spread means the angle between 2 directions in a plane for which the intensity is equal to 50% of the lower tolerance value of the peak intensity.
- 4) If, instead of obstacle marking, a flashing white light is used during the day to indicate temporary obstacles in the vicinity of an aerodrome, the peak effective intensity of the light must be increased to $20\,000 \pm 25\%$ cd when the background luminance is 50 cd/m^2 or greater.

3.1.2. NASF Guideline D

NASF Guideline D suggests consideration of the following measures specific to the marking and lighting of WMTs:

- the top 1/3 of wind monitoring towers to be painted in alternating contrasting bands of colour. Examples of effective measures can be found in the Manual of Standards for Part 139 of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998. In areas where aerial agriculture operations take place, marker balls or high visibility flags can be used to increase the visibility of the towers;
- marker balls or high visibility flags or high visibility sleeves placed on the outside guy wires;
- ensuring the guy wire ground attachment points have contrasting colours to the surrounding ground/vegetation; **or**
- a flashing strobe light during daylight hours.

3.1.3. AC139.E-05

AC139.E-05 provides guidance on matters that should be considered when assessing a wind farm development and other tall structure so that all necessary measures can be taken to protect aviation safety. Wind farms and monitoring towers (turbine installations) and other tall structures may pose a safety risk to

aviation due to their physical characteristics, size and location. Mitigation measures such as warning lights and reporting of tall structures that are at least 100m AGL, are also described.

2.5 Aviation hazard lighting - International best practice

2.5.1 This section describes the science behind aviation hazard lighting.

2.5.2 Australian regulations state that aircraft in uncontrolled airspace may operate under visual flight rules (VFR), which requires the pilot to remain clear of clouds and to adhere to visibility minima. CAR 172 and CAR 174 and the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) ENR 1.2 prescribe the following requirements:

– in Class G airspace below 3000 ft Above Mean Sea Level (AMSL) or 1000 ft AGL (whichever is the higher) – remain clear of cloud with minimum visibility of 5000 m.

– in Class G airspace below 10 000 ft AMSL (subject to the above) – remain 1000 ft vertically and 1500 m horizontally from cloud and with 5000 m visibility.

Note: Helicopters may be permitted to operate in lower visibility and that further exemptions may apply to special cases such as military, search and rescue, medical emergency, agricultural and fire-fighting operations.

2.5.3 ICAO Annex 14, Volume 1, Chapter 6.2 states that obstacles penetrating navigable airspace (which starts at the minimum flight altitude of 500 ft (152.4 m) AGL) outside of a built-up area, should be equipped with 2000 candela medium intensity obstacle lights.

2.5.4 2000 candela medium intensity obstacle lighting recommendation satisfies the 5000 m VFR visibility requirements, according to practical exercises undertaken by the FAA and documented in AC 70/7460-1L (FAA, 2015).

2.5.5 In Australia, CASA has accepted the use of 200 candela lighting in some circumstances due to a lack of back lighting in rural and remote areas, meaning that a lower intensity light is still visible to pilots at an acceptable distance to permit a pilot to see and avoid the obstacle.

2.6 Hazard lighting

2.6.1 This section describes the reasoning behind CASA's preference to recommend aviation hazard lighting for tall structures and aircraft detection systems for wind farms.

2.6.2 Hazard lighting for wind farms and other tall structures is intended to alert pilots, flying at low altitude, to the presence of an obstacle allowing them sufficient awareness to safely navigate around or avoid it. The pilot is responsible for avoiding other traffic and obstacles based on the "alerted" see-and-avoid principle.

2.6.3 Unless the wind farm or tall structure is located near an airport, it is not expected to pose a risk to regular public transport operations. The kind of air traffic that is usually encountered at low altitude in the vicinity of a wind farm or tall structure includes light aircraft (e.g., private operators, flight schools, sport aviation, agricultural, survey, and fire spotting and control) and helicopters (military, police, emergency services, survey, and fire spotting and control). Hazard lights are therefore designed to provide pilots with sufficient awareness about the presence of the structure(s), so they can avoid it. This means that the intensity of the hazard lights should be such that the acquisition distance is sufficient for the pilot to recognise the danger, take evasive action and avoid the obstacle by a safe margin in all visibility conditions. This outcome considers the potential speed of an aircraft to determine the distance by which the pilot must become aware of the obstacle to have enough time and manoeuvrability to avoid it.

It is Aviation Projects' assessment, via the Risk Assessment conducted, that there will be an acceptable level of aviation safety risk associated with the potential for an aircraft collision with the Project WMT without obstacle lighting on the WMT.

3.2. Overhead transmission line

There is no regulatory requirement to mark or light power poles or overhead transmission lines that do not infringe operational airspace at a certified aerodrome.

According to the AAAA Powerlines Policy dated March 2011:

Most agricultural land in Australia is crisscrossed with powerlines and aerial application companies and pilots put enormous effort into managing these hazards safely, generally using a risk identification, assessment and management process in line with Australian Standard AS4360/ISO 3[1]000.

The agricultural pilot curriculum mandated by CASA includes training for the safe management of powerlines and AAAA has been active in providing ongoing professional development for application pilots that includes a focus on planning, risk management and a knowledge of human factors relevant to managing powerlines in a low-level aviation environment.

AAAA runs a specific training course for aerial application pilots entitled 'Wire Risk Management' to address these issues.

Overhead transmission lines and/or supporting poles that are located where they could adversely affect aerial application operations should be identified in consultation with local aerial application operators and marked in accordance with MOS 139 Chapter 8 Division 10 section 8.110 (7) and section 8.110 (8):

8.110 Marking of hazardous obstacles

(7) Hazardous obstacles in the form of wires or cables must be marked using 3-dimensional coloured objects attached to the wire or cables. Note: Spheres and pyramids are examples of 3-dimensional objects.

(8) The objects mentioned in subsection (7) must:

- (a) be approximately equivalent in size to a cube with 600 mm sides; and*
- (b) be spaced 30 m apart along the length of the wire or cable.*

Following consultation with aerial operators, if a risk assessment is required, the Proponent should follow standards outlined in the AS 3891.2:2018 *Air navigation – Cables and their supporting structures – Marking and safety requirements Part 2: Low level aviation operations*.

4. ACCIDENT STATISTICS

This section establishes the external context to ensure that stakeholders and their objectives are considered when developing risk management criteria, and that externally generated threats and opportunities are properly taken into account.

4.1. General aviation operations

The general aviation (GA) activity group is considered by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) to be all flying activities that do not involve commercial air transport (activity group), which includes scheduled (RPT) and non-scheduled (charter) passenger and freight type. It may involve Australian civil (VH) registered aircraft, or aircraft registered outside of Australia. General aviation/recreational encompasses:

- Aerial work (activity type). Includes activity subtypes: agricultural mustering, agricultural spreading/spraying, other agricultural flying, photography, policing, firefighting, construction – sling loads, other construction, search and rescue, observation and patrol, power/pipeline surveying, other surveying, advertising, and other aerial work.
- Own business travel (activity type).
- Instructional flying (activity type). Includes activity subtypes: solo and dual flying training, and other instructional flying.
- Sport and pleasure flying (activity type). Includes activity subtypes: pleasure and personal transport, glider towing, aerobatics, community service flights, parachute dropping, and other sport and pleasure flying.
- Other general aviation flying (activity type). Includes activity subtypes: test flights, ferry flights and other flying.

4.2. ATSB occurrence taxonomy

The ATSB uses a taxonomy of occurrence sub-type. Of specific relevance to the subject assessment are terms associated with **terrain collision**. Definitions sourced from the ATSB website are provided below:

- **Collision with terrain:** Occurrences involving a collision between an airborne aircraft and the ground or water, where the flight crew were aware of the terrain prior to the collision.
- **Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT):** Occurrences where a serviceable aircraft, under flight crew control, is inadvertently flown into terrain, obstacles, or water without either sufficient or timely awareness by the flight crew to prevent the event.
- **Ground strike:** Occurrences where a part of the aircraft drags on, or strikes, the ground or water while the aircraft is in flight, or during take-off or landing.
- **Wirestrike:** Occurrences where an aircraft strikes a wire, such as a powerline, telephone wire, or guy wire, during normal operations.

4.3. National aviation occurrence statistics 2010-2019

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) recently published a summary of aviation occurrence statistics for the period 2010-2019 (AR-2020-014, Final - 29 April 2020).

According to the report, there were no fatalities in high or low capacity RPT operations during the period 2010-2019. In 2019, 220 aircraft were involved in accidents in Australia, and a further 154 aircraft involved in serious incidents (an incident with a high probability of becoming an accident). In 2019 there were 35 fatalities from 22 fatal accidents. There have been no fatalities in scheduled commercial air transport in Australia since 2005.

Of the 326 fatalities recorded in the 10-year period, almost two thirds (175 or 53.68%) occurred in the general aviation segment. On average, there were 1.51 fatalities per aircraft associated with a fatality in this segment. The fatalities to aircraft ratio ranges from 1.09 to 177:1. Whilst it can be inferred from the data that the majority of fatal accidents are single person fatalities, it is reasonable to assert that the worst credible effect of an aircraft accident in the general aviation category will be multiple fatalities.

A breakdown of aircraft and fatalities by general aviation sub-categories is provided in Table 1 (source: ATSB).

Table 1 Number of fatalities by General Aviation sub-category – 2010 to 2019

<i>Sub-category</i>	<i>Aircraft assoc. with fatality</i>	<i>Fatalities</i>	<i>Fatalities to aircraft ratio</i>
Aerial work	37	44	1.18:1
Instructional flying	11	19	1.72:1
Own business travel	3	5	1.6:1
Sport and pleasure flying	53	94	1.77:1
Other general aviation flying	11	12	1.09:1
Totals	115	174	1.51:1

Figure 3 refers to Fatal Accident Rate by operation type per million departures over the 6-year period (source: ATSB). Note the rates presented are not the full year range of the study (2010–2019). This was due to the availability of exposure data (departures and hours flown) which was only available between these years. According to the ATSB report, the number of fatal accidents per million departures for GA aircraft over the 6-year reporting period ranged between 6.6 in 2014 and 4.9 in 2019.




Figure 3 Fatal Accident Rate (per million departures) by Operation Type

In 2018, there were 9 fatal accidents and 9 fatalities involving GA aircraft, resulting in a rate of 5.6 fatal accidents per million departures and 7.7 fatal accidents per million hours flown.

In 2019, there were 1,760,000 landings, and 1,320,000 hours flown by VH-registered general aviation aircraft in Australia, with 8 fatal accidents and 17 fatalities. Based on these results, in 2019 there were 4.9 fatal accidents per million departures and 6.4 fatal accidents per million hours flown. A summary of fatal accidents from 2010-2019 by GA sub-category is provided in Table 2 (source: ATSB).

Table 2 Fatal accidents by GA sub-category – 2010 -2019

<i>Sub-category</i>	<i>Fatal accidents</i>	<i>Fatalities</i>
Agricultural spreading/spraying	13	13
Agricultural mustering	11	12
Other agricultural	1	1
Survey and photographic	5	10
Search and rescue	2	2
Firefighting	2	2
Other aerial work	3	4
Instructional flying	11	19

<i>Sub-category</i>	<i>Fatal accidents</i>	<i>Fatalities</i>
Own business travel	3	5
Sport and pleasure flying	53	94
Other general aviation flying	11	12
Total	115	174

Over the 10-year period and since, no aircraft collided with a WTG or a WMT in Australia.

Of the 20,529 incidents, serious incidents and accidents in GA operations in the 10-year period, 1,404 (6.83%) were terrain collisions.

The underlying fatality rate for GA operations discussed above is considered tolerable within Australia's regulatory and social context.

4.4. Worldwide accidents involving wind farms

Worldwide since aviation accident statistics have been recorded, there have been a total of 4 aviation accidents involving a wind farm (i.e. where WTGs were erected). To provide some perspective on the likelihood of a VFR aircraft colliding with a WTG, a summary of the 4 accidents and the relevant factors applicable to this assessment is incorporated in this section.

Based on the statistics set out in the Global Wind Energy Council (GWEC) report 2016, there were 341,320 WTGs operating around the world at the end of 2016.

Based on the Australia's Clean Energy Council statistics there were 102 wind farms in Australia at the end of 2019. Aviation Projects has researched public sources of information, regarding aviation safety occurrences associated with wind farms. Occurrence information published by Australia, Canada, Europe (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden and The Netherlands), New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States of America was reviewed.

The 5 recorded aviation accidents involving a wind farm are summarised as follows:

- One accident occurred in Texas, United States in October 2019 resulting in minor aircraft damage no injury to the pilot and significant injury to a person on the ground. The aircraft, an Air Tractor AT502, was returning from a local aerial application flight and was flown deliberately at low-level in close vicinity to a wind turbine generator (WTG) because the pilot believed his friend was working on the turbine. The aircraft collided with a tagline rope that was attached to a blade of the WTG and which was being held by a person working on the ground. The worker was thrown about 20 ft in the air and experienced significant non-life-threatening injuries. The aircraft sustained minor damage however the pilot landed the aircraft without further incident.
- One accident, which resulted in 2 fatalities, occurred in Palm Springs in 2001. This accident involved a wind farm but was not caused by the wind farm. The cause of the accident was the inflight separation of the majority of the right canard and all of the right elevator resulting from a failure of the builder to balance the elevators per the kit manufacturer's instructions. The accident occurred above a wind farm, and the aircraft struck a WTG on its descent and therefore the cause of the accident was not attributable to the wind farm and not applicable to this AIA.
- Two accidents involving collision with a WTG were during the day, as follows:

- One accident occurred in Melle, Germany in 2017 as the result of a collision with a WTG mounted on a steel lattice tower at a very low altitude during the day with good visibility and no cloud. The accident resulted in one fatality. If the tower was solid and painted white, as is standard on contemporary wind farms, then it more than likely would have been more visible than it was. If it were to be equipped with an obstacle light which in all likelihood would not have been operating during daylight with good visibility conditions, it would in all likelihood, not be more visible than with just the white paint marking.
- One accident occurred in Plouguin, France in 2008 when the pilot decided to descend below cloud in an attempt to find the destination aerodrome. The aircraft was flying in conditions of significantly reduced horizontal visibility in fog where the top of the WTGs were obscured by cloud. The WTGs became visible too late for avoidance manoeuvring and the aircraft made contact with two WTGs. The aircraft was damaged but landed safely. No fatalities were recorded.
- In both of the above cases, it is difficult to conclude that obstacle lighting would have prevented the accidents.
- One fatal accident, near Highmore, South Dakota in 2014 occurred at night in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC).

There is one other accident mentioned in a database compiled by an anti-wind farm lobby group (wind-watch.org), which suggests a Cessna 182 collided with a WTG near Baraboo, Wisconsin, on 29 July 2000. The NTSB database records details of an accident involving a Cessna 182 that occurred on 28 July 2000 in the same area. For this particular accident, NTSB found that the probable cause of the accident was VFR flight into IMC encountered by the pilot and exceeding the design limits of the aircraft. A factor was flight to a destination alternate not performed by the pilot. No mention in the NTSB database is made of WTGs or a wind farm.

A summary of the 5 accidents is provided in Table 3.

Table 3 Summary of accidents involving collision with a WTG

<i>ID</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Fatalities</i>	<i>Flight rules</i>	<i>WTG height</i>	<i>Obstacle lighting</i>	<i>Cause of accident</i>	<i>Relevant to obstacle lighting at night</i>
1	Air Tractor AT502 N9143F collided with a tagline rope attached to wind turbine generator blade while being flown deliberately in close proximity to the WTG.	22 October 2019	Dawson County, Texas	0	Day VFR	Not specified	Not specified	The pilot's improper decision to manoeuvre at a low altitude and in close proximity to a wind turbine undergoing maintenance, which resulted in a collision with a tagline rope being held by a worker on the ground and serious injury to the worker.	Not applicable
2	Diamond DA320-A1 D-EJAR Collided with a WTG approximately 20 m above the ground, during the day in good visibility. The mast was grey steel lattice, rather than white, although the blades were painted in white and red bands.	02 Feb 2017	Melle, Germany	1	Day VFR No cloud and good visibility	Not specified	Not specified	Not specified	Not applicable

<i>ID</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Fatalities</i>	<i>Flight rules</i>	<i>WTG height</i>	<i>Obstacle lighting</i>	<i>Cause of accident</i>	<i>Relevant to obstacle lighting at night</i>
3	<p>The Piper PA-32R-300, N8700E, was destroyed during an impact with the blades of a WTG, at night in IMC.</p> <p>The wind farm was not marked on either sectional chart covering the accident location; however, the pilot was reportedly aware of the presence of the wind farm.</p>	27 Apr 2014	10 miles south of Highmore, South Dakota	4	Night IMC Low cloud and rain	420 ft AGL overall	Fitted but reportedly not operational on the WTG that was struck	<p>The NTSB determined the probable cause(s) of this accident to be the pilot's decision to continue the flight into known deteriorating weather conditions at a low altitude and his subsequent failure to remain clear of an unlit WTG.</p> <p>Contributing to the accident was the inoperative obstacle light on the WTG, which prevented the pilot from visually identifying the WTG.</p>	An operational obstacle light may have prevented the accident.

<i>ID</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Fatalities</i>	<i>Flight rules</i>	<i>WTG height</i>	<i>Obstacle lighting</i>	<i>Cause of accident</i>	<i>Relevant to obstacle lighting at night</i>
4	<p>Beechcraft B55</p> <p>The pilot was attempting to remain in VMC by descending the aircraft through a break in the clouds. The pilot, distracted by trying to visually locate the aerodrome, flew into an area of known presence of WTGs.</p> <p>After sighting the WTGs he was unable to avoid them. The tip of the left wing struck the first WTG blade, followed by the tip of the right wing striking the blade of a second WTG.</p> <p>The pilot was able to maintain control of the aircraft and landed safely.</p>	04 Apr 2008	Plouguin, France	0	<p>Day VFR</p> <p>The weather in the area of the WTGs had deteriorated to an overcast of stratus cloud, with a base between 100 ft to 350 ft and tops of 500 ft.</p>	328 ft AGL hub height, 393 ft AGL overall	Not specified	<p>This pilot reported having been distracted by a troubling personal matter which he had learned of before departing for the flight.</p> <p>The wind farm was annotated on aeronautical charts.</p>	Not applicable

<i>ID</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Fatalities</i>	<i>Flight rules</i>	<i>WTG height</i>	<i>Obstacle lighting</i>	<i>Cause of accident</i>	<i>Relevant to obstacle lighting at night</i>
5	VariEze N25063 The aircraft collided with a WTG following in-flight separation of the majority of the right canard and all of the right elevator.	20 July 2001	Palm Springs, USA	2	Day VFR	N/A	N/A	The failure of the builder to balance the elevators per the kit manufacturer's instructions. The cause of this accident is not attributable to the wind farm.	Not applicable

5. RISK ASSESSMENT

A risk management framework is comprised of likelihood and consequence descriptors, a matrix used to derive a level of risk, and actions required of management according to the level of risk.

The risk assessment framework used by Aviation Projects and risk event description is provided in **Annexure 4**.

5.1. Risk Identification

The primary risk being assessed is that of aviation safety associated with the height and location of WTGs and WMT proposed by the Project.

Based on an extensive review of accident statistics data (see summary in Section 4 above) five identified risk events associated with WTGs and WMTs relate to aviation safety or potential visual impact, and are listed as follows:

1. potential for an aircraft to collide with a WTG, controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) (related to aviation safety).
2. potential for an aircraft to collide with a WMT (CFIT) (related to aviation safety).
3. potential for a pilot to initiate manoeuvring in order to avoid colliding with a WTG or WMT resulting in collision with terrain (related to aviation safety).
4. potential for the hazards associated with the Project to invoke operational limitations or procedures on operating crew (related to aviation safety).
5. Potential effect of obstacle lighting on neighbours (related to potential visual impact).

It should be noted that according to guidance provided by the Commonwealth Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications, and in line with generally accepted practice, the risk to be assessed should primarily be associated with passenger transport services. Therefore, the risk being assessed herein is primarily associated with smaller aircraft likely to be flying under the VFR, and so the maximum number of passengers exposed to the nominated consequences is likely to be limited.

The five risk events identified here are assessed in detail in the following section.

5.2. Risk Analysis, Evaluation and Treatment

For the purpose of considering applicable consequences, the concept of worst credible effect has been used. Untreated risk is first evaluated, then, if the resulting level of risk is unacceptable, further treatments are identified to reduce the residual level of risk to an acceptable level.

A summary of the level of risk associated with the Project, under the proposed treatment regime, with specific consideration of the effect of obstacle lighting, is provided in Table 4 through to Table 8.

Table 4 Aircraft collision with wind turbine generator (WTG)

Risk ID:	1. Aircraft collision with wind turbine generator (WTG) (CFIT)
<p>Discussion</p> <p>An aircraft collision with a WTG would result in harm to people and damage to property. Property could include the aircraft itself, as well as the WTG.</p> <p>There have been 5 reported occurrences worldwide of aircraft collisions with a component of a WTG structure since the year 2000 as discussed in Section 4. These reports show a range of situations where pilots were conducting various flying operations at low level and in the vicinity of wind farms in both IMC and VMC. No reports of aircraft collisions with wind farms in Australia have been found.</p> <p>In consideration of the circumstances that would lead to a collision with a WTG:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> GA VFR aircraft operators generally don't individually fly a significant number of hours in total, let alone in the area in question at altitudes near to the height of the WTGs. Low level turbulence and fuel efficiency make it more comfortable to fly at a much higher altitude where the pilot can identify navigation features more easily than at low level. There is a very small chance that a pilot, suffering the stress of deteriorating weather, will continue into poor weather conditions (contrary to the rules of flight) rather than divert away from it, is not aware of the wind farm, will not consider it or will not be able to accurately navigate around it. The wind farm details, including height information, will be published on aeronautical charts to enable pilots to be aware of its presence If the aircraft was flown through the wind farm, there is still a very small chance that it would hit a WTG due to the distance between WTGs. <p>Refer to the discussion of worldwide accidents in Section 4.</p> <p>There are no known aerial application operations conducted at night in the vicinity of the Project site.</p> <p>If a proposed object or structure is identified as likely to be an obstacle, details of the relevant proposal must be referred to CASA for CASA to determine, in writing:</p> <p>(a) whether the object or structure will be a hazard to aircraft operations</p> <p>(b) whether it requires an obstacle light that is essential for the safety of aircraft operations</p> <p>The Project site is clear of the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS) of any aerodrome and outside the nominal circuit area of the Beaufort ALA, 7 km southwest of the Project site.</p>	
<p>Consequence</p> <p>If an aircraft collided with a WTG, the worst credible effect would be multiple fatalities and damage beyond repair. This would be a Catastrophic consequence.</p>	
	<p>Consequence Catastrophic</p>
<p>Untreated Likelihood</p> <p>There have been 4 reports of aircraft collisions with WTGs worldwide, which have resulted in a range of consequences, where aircraft occupants sustained minor injury in some cases and fatal injuries in others (see Section 4). Similarly, aircraft damage sustained ranged from minor to catastrophic. One of these accidents resulted from structural failure of the aircraft before the collision with the WTG. Only two relevant accidents occurred during the day, and only one resulted in a single fatality. It is assessed that collision with a WTG</p>	

resulting in multiple fatalities and damage beyond repair is unlikely to occur, but possible (has occurred rarely), which is classified as Possible.

<i>Untreated Likelihood</i>		Possible
Current Treatments (without lighting)		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Project site is clear of the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS) of any aerodrome and the nominal circuit area of the Beaufort ALA. Aircraft are restricted to a minimum height of 500 ft (152.4 m) AGL above the highest point of the terrain and any object on it within a radius of 300 m in visual flight during the day when not in the vicinity of built-up areas. The proposed WTGs will be a maximum height of 252 m AGL (641.14 m, 2103.5 ft AMSL) at the top of the blade tip. The rotor blade at its maximum height will be approximately 99.6 m (326.8 ft) above aircraft flying at the minimum altitude of 152.4 m AGL (500 ft). In the event that a VFR pilot decides to continue into an area of descending cloud requiring descent to below 500 ft (152.4 m) AGL, the minimum visibility of 5,000 m required for visual flight during the day should provide adequate time for pilots to observe and manoeuvre their aircraft clear of WTGs. If cloud descends below the WTG hub (assumed to be approximately 200 m AGL), obstacle lighting would be obscured and therefore ineffective. During VFR flight at night, aircraft are restricted to a minimum height of 304.8 m (1,000 ft) above obstacles (including terrain) which are within 10 nm of the aircraft and potentially even higher during instrument flight (day or night). Aircraft authorised to intentionally fly below 152.4 m (500 ft) AGL (day) or below safety height (night) are operated in accordance with procedures developed as an outcome of thorough risk management activities undertaken specifically for and prior to undertaking such authorised flights. Any obstacle including WTGs in the path of the authorised flight would be specifically risk assessed during that process. The WTGs are typically coloured white so they should be visible to pilots during the day. The 'as constructed' details of WTGs are required to be notified to Airservices Australia so that the location and height of all WTGs can be noted on aeronautical maps and charts. Because the Project WTGs are proposed to be above 100 m AGL, there is a statutory requirement to report the WTGs to CASA and notify Airservices Australia prior to construction. 		
Level of Risk		
The level of risk associated with a Possible likelihood of a Catastrophic consequence is 8 (Unacceptable).		
<i>Current Level of Risk</i>		8 - Unacceptable
Risk Decision		
A risk level of 8 is classified as Unacceptable: Immediate action required by either treating or avoiding risk. Refer to executive management.		
<i>Risk Decision</i>		Unacceptable
Recommended Treatments		

The following treatments which can be implemented at little cost will provide an acceptable level of safety:

- Details of the Project should be communicated to local and regional aircraft operators prior to construction to heighten their awareness of its location and so that they can plan their operations accordingly. Specifically:
 - Engage with local aerial agricultural and aerial firefighting operators to develop procedures, which may include, for example, stopping the rotation of the WTG blades prior to the commencement of the subject aircraft operations within the Project site.
 - Arrangements should be made to publish details of the Project in ERSA for surrounding aerodromes, and on aeronautical charts, which would involve notification to Airservices Australia.

Residual Risk

With the implementation of the Recommended Treatments listed above, the likelihood of an aircraft collision with a WTG resulting in multiple fatalities and damage beyond repair will be **Unlikely**, and the consequence remains **Catastrophic**, resulting in an overall risk level of **7 - Tolerable**.

It is considered that the significant cost of obstacle lighting (which is not a preventative control), may only slightly reduce the likelihood of a collision given that the pilot is already in a highly undesirable situation (and not in all situations – such as where the obstacle light may be obscured by cloud) and hence is not justified.

The level of risk with the implementation of the Recommended Treatments is considered **As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)**.

It is our assessment that there will be an acceptable level of aviation safety risk associated with the potential for an aircraft collision with a Project WTG without obstacle lighting on the WTGs.

Residual Risk	7 - Tolerable
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Table 5 Aircraft collision with wind monitoring tower (WMT)

Risk ID:	2. Aircraft collision with a wind monitoring tower (WMT) (CFIT)
<p>Discussion</p> <p>An aircraft collision with a WMT would result in harm to people and damage to property.</p> <p>There is one WMT as part of the Project.</p> <p>The WMT will be free standing at a maximum height of 140 m (459.3 ft) AGL.</p> <p>The proposed mast will be marked in accordance with NASF Guideline D recommendations and CASA Part 139 MOS requirements.</p> <p>The location of the proposed WMT and other applicable details has been provided to Airservices Australia.</p> <p>There are a few instances of aircraft colliding with a WMT, but they were all during the day with good visibility. None were in Australia.</p> <p>There is a relatively low rate of aircraft activity in the vicinity of the Project site. The majority of those will be operating at altitudes well in excess of the top of the WMT.</p> <p>There are no known aerial application operations conducted at night in the vicinity of the wind farm.</p> <p>If a proposed object or structure is identified as likely to be an obstacle, details of the relevant proposal will be referred to CASA for CASA to determine, in writing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • whether the object or structure will be a hazard to aircraft operations • whether it requires an obstacle light that is essential for the safety of aircraft operations. 	
<p>Consequence</p> <p>If an aircraft collided with a WMT, the worst credible effect would be multiple fatalities and damage beyond repair. This would be a Catastrophic consequence.</p>	
	<p>Consequence</p> <p>Catastrophic</p>
<p>Untreated Likelihood</p> <p>There are a few occurrences of an aircraft colliding with a WMT, but all were during the day with good visibility when obstacle lighting would arguably be of no effect, and none were in Australia. It is assessed that collision with a WMT without obstacle lighting that would be effective in alerting the pilot to its presence is unlikely to occur, but possible (has occurred rarely), which is classified as Possible.</p>	
	<p>Untreated Likelihood</p> <p>Possible</p>
<p>Current Treatments</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The mast locations will be advised to CASA and Airservices Australia prior to construction. • Aircraft are restricted to a minimum height of 152.4 m (500 ft) AGL above the highest point of the terrain and any object on it within a radius of 300 m in visual flight during the day when not in the vicinity of built up areas. The highest permanent WMT will be at a maximum height of 140 m (459.3 ft), which will be 12.4 m (40.7 ft) below the minimum height of 500 ft AGL for an aircraft flying at this height. 	

- In the event that descending cloud forces an aircraft lower than 152.4 m (500 ft) AGL, the minimum visibility of 5,000 m required for visual flight during the day, the mast markings should provide adequate time for pilots to observe and manoeuvre their aircraft clear of the tower.
- Aircraft are restricted to a minimum height of 304.8 m (1,000 ft) above obstacles within 10 nm of the aircraft in visual flight at night and potentially even higher during instrument flight (day or night) until within 3 nm of the destination aerodrome.
- The WTGs and mast will be shown on aeronautical charts at the next publication cycle date available and NOTAMS prior to the publication date. This allows pilots to be aware of the existence of the wind farm at the pre-flight planning stage and during flight with reference to the aeronautical chart.
- Aircraft authorised to intentionally fly below 152.4 m (500 ft) (day) or below safety height (night) are operated in accordance with procedures developed as an outcome of thorough risk management activities.
- Since the masts will be higher than 100 m AGL, there is a statutory requirement to report them to CASA and Airservices Australia prior to construction.

Level of Risk

The level of risk associated with a Possible likelihood of a Catastrophic consequence is 8.

Current Level of Risk

8 - Unacceptable

Risk Decision

A risk level of 8 is classified as Unacceptable: Immediate action required by either treating or avoiding risk. Refer to executive management.

Risk Decision

Unacceptable

Recommended Treatments

The following treatments which can be implemented at little cost will provide an acceptable level of safety:

- Details of the WMT have been advised to Airservices Australia.
- Consideration could be given to marking any wind monitoring towers according to the requirements set in MOS 139 Chapter 8 Division 10 Obstacle Markings (as modified by the guidance in NASF Guideline D); specifically:

8.110 (5) As illustrated in Figure 8.110 (5), long, narrow structures like masts, poles and towers which are hazardous obstacles must be marked in contrasting colour bands so that the darker colour is at the top; and the bands are, as far as physically possible, marked at right angles along the length of the long, narrow structure; and have a length ("z" in Figure 8.110 (5)) that is, approximately, the lesser of: 1/7 of the height of the structure; or 30 m.

8.110 (7) Hazardous obstacles in the form of wires or cables must be marked using 3-dimensional coloured objects attached to the wire or cables. Note: Spheres and pyramids are examples of 3-dimensional objects. (8) The objects mentioned in subsection (7) must: be approximately equivalent in size to a cube with 600 mm sides; and be spaced 30 m apart along the length of the wire or cable.
- WMTs that are installed prior to WTG installation and WMTs that are not in close proximity to a WTG, if higher than 150 m AGL should be fitted with a medium intensity steady red obstacle light at the top of

the tower to ensure visibility in low light and deteriorated atmospheric conditions. Characteristics of medium-intensity lights are specified in MOS 139 Section 9.33:

- 1) *Medium-intensity obstacle lights must:*
 - a) *be visible in all directions in azimuth; and*
 - b) *if flashing — have a flash frequency of between 20 and 60 flashes per minute.*
- 2) *The peak effective intensity of medium-intensity obstacle lights must be 2 000 ± 25% cd with a vertical distribution as follows:*
 - a) *for **vertical beam spread** — a minimum of 3 degrees;*
 - b) *at -1 degree elevation — a minimum of 50% of the lower tolerance value of the peak intensity;*
 - c) *at 0 degrees elevation — a minimum of 100% of the lower tolerance value of the peak intensity.*
- 3) *For subsection (2), **vertical beam spread** means the angle between 2 directions in a plane for which the intensity is equal to 50% of the lower tolerance value of the peak intensity.*
- 4) *If, instead of obstacle marking, a flashing white light is used during the day to indicate temporary obstacles in the vicinity of an aerodrome, the peak effective intensity of the light must be increased to 20 000 ± 25% cd when the background luminance is 50 cd/m² or greater.*

Residual Risk

With the additional Recommended Treatments listed above, the likelihood of an aircraft collision with a WMT resulting in multiple fatalities and damage beyond repair will be **Unlikely**, and the consequence remains **Catastrophic**, resulting in an overall risk level of **7 – Tolerable**.

It is considered that the significant cost of obstacle lighting (which is not a preventative control), may only slightly reduce the likelihood of a collision given that the pilot is already in a highly undesirable situation (and not in all situations – such as where the obstacle light may be obscured by cloud) and hence is not justified.

Under these circumstances, the level of risk under the proposed treatment plan is considered **ALARP**.

It is our assessment that there will be an acceptable level of aviation safety risk associated with the potential for an aircraft collision with the Project WMT without obstacle lighting.

Residual Risk	7 - Tolerable
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Table 6 Harsh manoeuvring leading to controlled flight into terrain

Risk ID:	3. Harsh manoeuvring leads to controlled flight into terrain (CFIT)	
Discussion		
<p>An aircraft colliding with terrain as a result of manoeuvring to avoid colliding with a WTG would result in harm to people and damage to property.</p> <p>There are a few ground collision accidents resulting from manoeuvring to avoid wind farms, but none in Australia, and all were during the day.</p> <p>The Project site is clear of the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS) of any aerodrome and the nominal circuit area of the Beaufort ALA.</p> <p>Aircraft are restricted to a minimum height of 500 ft (152.4 m) AGL above the highest point of the terrain and any object on it within a radius of 300 m in visual flight during the day when not in the vicinity of built-up areas. The proposed WTGs will be a maximum height of 252 m AGL (641.14 m, 2103.5 ft AMSL) at the top of the blade tip. The rotor blade at its maximum height will be approximately 99.6 m (326.8 ft) above aircraft flying at the minimum altitude of 152.4 m AGL (500 ft).</p> <p>Nevertheless, the minimum visibility of 5000 m required for visual flight during the day should provide adequate time for pilots to observe and manoeuvre their aircraft clear of WTGs. The WTGs are large and coloured white, making them visible at greater distances than the effectiveness of recommended lighting treatments.</p> <p>If cloud descends below the WTG hub, obstacle lighting would be obscured and therefore ineffective.</p> <p>Aircraft are restricted to a minimum height of 304.8 m (1000 ft) above obstacles within 10 nm of the aircraft in visual flight at night and potentially even higher during instrument flight (day or night).</p> <p>Aircraft authorised to intentionally fly below 152.4 m (500 ft) AGL (day) or below safety height (night) are operated in accordance with procedures developed as an outcome of thorough risk management activities.</p>		
Assumed risk treatments		
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The WTGs are typically coloured white so they would be visible during the day.• The ‘as constructed’ details of WTGs are required to be notified to Airservices Australia so that the location and height of WTGs can be noted on aeronautical maps and charts.• Since the WTGs will be higher than 100 m AGL, there is a statutory requirement to report them to CASA.		
Consequence		
<p>If an aircraft collided with terrain, the worst credible effect would be multiple fatalities and damage beyond repair. This would be a Catastrophic consequence.</p>		
Consequence		Catastrophic
Untreated Likelihood		
<p>There are a few ground collision accidents resulting from manoeuvring to avoid WTGs, but none in Australia, and all were during the day (see Section 8). It is assessed that a ground collision accident following manoeuvring to avoid a WTG is unlikely to occur, but possible (has occurred rarely), which is classified as Possible.</p>		
Untreated Likelihood		Possible
Current Treatments (without lighting)		

- The Project site is clear of the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS) of certified aerodromes and the nominal circuit area of the Beaufort ALA.
- Aircraft are restricted to a minimum height of 152.4 m (500 ft) above the highest point of the terrain and any object on it within a radius of 300 m in visual flight during the day when not in the vicinity of built-up areas.
- WTGs will be a maximum of 252 m (826.8 ft) at the top of the blade tip AGL. The rotor blade at its maximum height will be approximately 99.6 m (326.8 ft) above aircraft flying at the minimum altitude of 152.4 m AGL (500 ft).
- Nevertheless, the minimum visibility of 5000 m required for visual flight during the day should provide adequate time for pilots to observe and manoeuvre their aircraft clear of WTGs.
- The WTGs will be shown on aeronautical charts at the next publication cycle date available and NOTAMS prior to the publication date. This allows pilots to be aware of the existence of the wind farm at the pre-flight planning stage and during flight with reference to the aeronautical chart.
- If cloud descends below the WTG hub, obstacle lighting would be obscured and therefore ineffective.
- Aircraft are restricted to a minimum height of 304.8 m (1000 ft) above obstacles within 10 nm of the aircraft in visual flight at night and potentially even higher during instrument flight (day or night).
- Aircraft authorised to intentionally fly below 152.4 m AGL (500 ft) (day) or below safety height (night) are operated in accordance with procedures developed as an outcome of thorough risk management activities.
- The WTGs are typically coloured white, typical of most WTGs operational in Australia, so they should be visible during the day at distances in excess of visibility of obstacle lighting.
- The 'as constructed' details of WTGs are required to be notified to Airservices Australia so that the location and height of wind farms can be noted on aeronautical maps and charts.
- Since the WTGs will be higher than 100 m AGL, there is a statutory requirement to report the WTGs to CASA.

Level of Risk

The level of risk associated with a Possible likelihood of a Catastrophic consequence is 8.

Current Level of Risk

8 – Unacceptable

Risk Decision

A risk level of 8 is classified as Unacceptable: Immediate action required by either treating or avoiding risk. Refer to executive management.

Risk Decision

Unacceptable

Recommended Treatments

The following treatments which can be implemented at little cost will provide an acceptable level of safety:

- Ensure details of the Project WTGs have been communicated to Airservices Australia, and local and regional aerodrome and aircraft operators prior to construction.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Although there is no requirement to do so, the Proponent may consider engaging with local aerial agricultural and aerial firefighting operators to develop procedures for their safe operation within the Project site. 	
<p>Residual Risk</p> <p>With the additional Recommended Treatments listed above, the likelihood of ground collision resulting from manoeuvring to avoid a WTG resulting in multiple fatalities and damage beyond repair will be Unlikely, and the consequence remains Catastrophic, resulting in an overall risk level of 7 – Tolerable.</p> <p>It is considered that the significant cost of obstacle lighting (which is not a preventative control), may only slightly reduce the likelihood of a collision given that the pilot is already in a highly undesirable situation (and not in all situations – such as where the obstacle light may be obscured by cloud) and hence is not justified.</p> <p>In the circumstances, the level of risk under the proposed treatment plan is considered ALARP.</p> <p>It is assessed that there is an acceptable level of aviation safety risk associated with the potential for ground collision resulting from manoeuvring to avoid a Project WTG without obstacle lighting on the WTGs.</p>	
	<p>Residual Risk 7 - Tolerable</p>

Table 7 Effect of the Project on operating crew

Risk ID:	4. Effect of the Project on operating crew	
Discussion		
Introduction or imposition of additional operating procedures or limitations can affect an aircraft's operating crew.		
There are no known aerial application operations conducted at night in the vicinity of the Project site.		
Consequence		
The worst credible effect a wind farm could have on flight crew would be the imposition of operational limitations, and in some cases, the potential for use of emergency procedures. This would be a Minor consequence.		
Consequence		Minor
Untreated Likelihood		
The imposition of operational limitations is unlikely to occur, but possible (has occurred rarely), which is classified as Possible.		
Untreated Likelihood		Possible
Current Treatments		
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The Project site is clear of the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS) of any aerodrome and the nominal circuit area of the Beaufort ALA.• Aircraft are restricted to a minimum height of 152.4 m (500 ft) above the highest point of the terrain and any object on it within a radius of 300 m in visual flight during the day when not in the vicinity of built-up areas.• The WTGs and masts will be shown on aeronautical charts at the next publication cycle date available and NOTAMS prior to the publication date. This allows pilots to be aware of the existence of the wind farm at the pre-flight planning stage and during flight with reference to the aeronautical chart.• The proposed WTGs will be a maximum height of 252 m AGL (641.14 m, 2103.5 ft AMSL) at the top of the blade tip. The rotor blade at its maximum height will be approximately 99.6 m (326.8 ft) above aircraft flying at the minimum altitude of 152.4 m AGL (500 ft).• In the event that descending cloud forces an aircraft lower than 500 ft (152.4 m) AGL, the minimum visibility of 5000 m required for visual flight during the day should provide adequate time for pilots to observe and manoeuvre their aircraft clear of WTGs.• Nevertheless, the minimum visibility of 5000 m required for visual flight during the day should provide adequate time for pilots to observe and manoeuvre their aircraft clear of WTGs by the required margin.• If cloud descends below the WTG hub, obstacle lighting would be obscured and therefore ineffective.• Aircraft are restricted to a minimum height of 304.8 m (1000 ft) above obstacles within 10 nm of the aircraft in visual flight at night and potentially even higher during instrument flight (day or night).		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Aircraft authorised to intentionally fly below 152.4 m AGL (500 ft) (day) or below safety height (night) are operated in accordance with procedures developed as an outcome of thorough risk management activities. The WTGs are typically coloured white so they should be visible during the day. The 'as constructed' details of WTGs are required to be notified to Airservices Australia so that the location and height of wind farms can be noted on aeronautical maps and charts. Since the WTGs will be higher than 100 m AGL, there is a statutory requirement to report the WTGs to CASA. 	
Level of Risk The level of risk associated with a Possible likelihood of a Minor consequence is 5.	
Current Level of Risk	5 - Tolerable
Risk Decision A risk level of 5 is classified as Tolerable: Treatment action possibly required to achieve ALARP - conduct cost/benefit analysis. Relevant manager to consider for appropriate action.	
Risk Decision	Accept, conduct cost benefit analysis
Recommended Treatments <p>Given the current treatments and the limited scale and scope of flying operations conducted within the vicinity of the Project site, there is likely to be little additional safety benefits to be gained by installing obstacle lighting for WTGs and Permanent WMTs which are in close proximity to WTGs.</p> <p>WMTs installed prior to WTG installation and those that are not in relatively close proximity to a WTG should be lit to ensure they are visible in low light and deteriorating atmospheric conditions. (see Risk ID: 2)</p> <p>The following additional treatments will provide an additional margin of safety:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure details of the Project WTGs and masts have been communicated to Airservices Australia, and local and regional aerodrome and aircraft operators prior to construction. Although there is no requirement to do so, the Proponent may consider engaging with local aerial agricultural and aerial firefighting operators to develop procedures for such aircraft operations in the vicinity of the Project site. 	
Residual Risk <p>Notwithstanding the current level of risk is considered Tolerable, the additional Recommended Treatments listed above will enhance aviation safety. The likelihood remains Possible, and consequence remains Minor. In the circumstances, the risk level of 5 is considered ALARP.</p> <p>It is our assessment that there is an acceptable level of aviation safety risk associated with the potential for operational limitations to affect aircraft operating crew, without obstacle lighting on the Project WTGs and Permanent WMTs in close proximity to a WTG, and with obstacle lighting for temporary WMTs installed prior to WTG installation and WMTs that are not in close proximity to a WTG.</p>	
Residual Risk	5 – Tolerable

Table 8 Effect of obstacle lighting on neighbours

Risk ID:	5. Effect of obstacle lighting on neighbours	
Discussion		
<p>This scenario discusses the consequential impact of a decision to install obstacle lighting on the wind farm.</p> <p>Installation and operation of obstacle lighting on WTGs or masts can have an effect on neighbours' visual amenity and enjoyment, specifically at night and in good visibility conditions.</p> <p>If a proposed object or structure is identified as likely to be an obstacle, details of the relevant proposal must be referred to CASA for CASA to determine, in writing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">(a) whether the object or structure will be a hazard to aircraft operations(b) whether it requires an obstacle light that is essential for the safety of aircraft operations. <p>In general, objects outside an OLS and above 100 m would require obstacle lighting unless CASA, in an aeronautical study, assesses it is shielded by another lit object or it is of no operational significance.</p>		
Consequence		
<p>The worst credible effect of obstacle lighting specifically at night in good visibility conditions would be:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Moderate site impact, minimal local impact, important consideration at local or regional level, possible long-term cumulative effect. Not likely to be decision making issues. Design and mitigation measures may ameliorate some consequences. <p>This would be a Moderate consequence.</p>		
Consequence		Moderate
Untreated Likelihood		
<p>The likelihood of moderate site impact, minimal local impact is Almost certain - the event is likely to occur many times (has occurred frequently).</p>		
Untreated Likelihood		Almost certain
Current Treatments		
<p>If the WTGs or masts will be higher than 150 m (492 ft) AGL, they must be regarded as obstacles unless CASA assess otherwise. In general, objects outside an OLS and above 100 m would require obstacle lighting unless CASA, in an aeronautical study, assesses it is shielded by another lit object or it is of no operational significance.</p>		
Level of Risk		
<p>The level of risk associated with an Almost certain likelihood of a Moderate consequence is 8.</p>		
Current Level of Risk		8 - Unacceptable
Risk Decision		
<p>A risk level of 8 is classified as Unacceptable: Immediate action required by either treating or avoiding risk. Refer to executive management.</p>		
Risk Decision		Unacceptable

Recommended Treatments

Not installing obstacle lighting would completely remove the source of the impact.

As per the above safety risk assessment, the provision of lighting for the WTGs and permanent masts is not necessary to provide an acceptable level of safety. For temporary WMTs installed prior to WTG installation and masts that are not in close proximity to a WTG, obstacle lighting is recommended to ensure visibility in low light and deteriorating atmospheric conditions.

If CASA or a planning authority decide that obstacle lighting is required there are impact reduction measures that can be implemented to reduce the impact of lighting on surrounding neighbours, including:

- reducing the number of WTGs with obstacle lights
- specifying an obstacle light that minimises light intensity at ground level
- specifying an obstacle light that matches light intensity to meteorological visibility
- mitigating light glare from obstacle lighting through measures such as baffling.

These measures are designed to optimise the benefit of the obstacle lights to pilots while minimising the visual impact to residents within and around the Project site.

Consideration may be given to activating the obstacle lighting via a pilot activated lighting system.

An option is to consider using Aircraft Detection Lighting Systems (referred in the United States Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular AC70/7460-1L CHG1 – *Obstruction Marking and Lighting*). Such a system would only activate the lights when an aircraft is detected in the near vicinity and deactivate the lighting once the aircraft has passed. This technology reduces the impact of night lighting on nearby communities and migratory birds and extends the life expectancy of obstruction lights. One such system was installed on a wind farm in Australia but was decommissioned due to reliability issues.

Residual Risk

Not installing obstacle lights would clearly be an acceptable outcome to those potentially affected by visual impact.

If lighting is required, consideration of visual impact in the lighting design should enable installation of lighting that reduces the impact to neighbours.

The likelihood of a **Moderate** consequence remains **Likely**, with a resulting risk level of **7 – Tolerable**.

It is our assessment that visual impact from obstacle lights can be negated if they are not installed. If obstacle lights are to be installed, they can be designed so that there is an acceptable risk of visual impact to neighbours.

Residual Risk

7 - Tolerable

6. CONCLUSIONS

The key conclusions of this obstacle lighting risk assessment are summarised as follows:

6.1. Aviation Impact Statement from prior report

Based on the Project WTG layout and maximum blade tip height of up to 641.14 m AHD (2103.5 ft AMSL) the Project:

- would not penetrate any OLS surfaces
- would not infringe the PANS-OPS surface related to the Ballarat aerodrome 25 nm MSA
- will not have an impact on grid LSALTs
- will not have an impact on the LSALTs for nearby designated air routes.
- will not have an impact on operational airspace
- is wholly contained within Class G airspace
- is outside the clearance zones associated with civil aviation navigation aids and communication facilities.

6.2. Aircraft operator characteristics

Aircraft will be required to navigate around the Project site in low cloud conditions if aircraft need to fly at 500 ft AGL.

WTGs are generally not a safety concern to aerial agricultural operators. WMTs remain the primary safety concern to aerial agricultural operators, who have expressed a general desire for these towers to be more visible. Landowner briefings including disclosure of the location of the WMT would make the aerial agricultural pilot more aware of the presence of a WMT to help them avoid it.

6.3. Hazard marking and lighting

The following conclusions apply to hazard marking and lighting:

- With respect to CASR Part 139 Division 139.E.1 Notifying potential hazards 139.165, the proposed WTGs and WMTs must be reported to CASA. WTGs and WMTs must be marked in accordance with Part 139 MOS 2019 Chapter 8 Division 10 section 8.110.
- WTGs must be lit in accordance with Part 139 MOS 2019 Chapter 9 Division 4 9.30 and 9.31, unless an aeronautical study assesses they are of no operational significance, as this risk assessment concludes.
- With respect to marking of WTGs, a white colour will provide sufficient contrast with the surrounding environment to maintain an acceptable level of safety while lowering visual impact to the neighbouring residents.
- The WMT are marked according to the requirements set out in Manual of Standards (MOS) 139 Section 8.10 (as modified by the guidance in NASF Guideline D). Aviation marker balls and painting the top 1/3 of WMTs structures in red and white bands is considered to be an acceptable mitigation strategy.
- WTGs will not require obstacle lighting to maintain an acceptable level of safety to aircraft.
- WMTs that are lower than 150 m, will not require obstacle lighting to maintain an acceptable level of safety.

6.4. Summary of risks

A summary of the level of residual risk associated with the Project with the Recommended Treatments implemented, is provided in Table 9.

Table 9 Summary of Residual Risks

<i>Identified Risk</i>	<i>Consequence</i>	<i>Likelihood</i>	<i>Risk</i>	<i>Actions Required</i>
Aircraft collision with wind turbine generator (WTG)	Catastrophic	Unlikely	7	Acceptable without obstacle lighting (ALARP). Communicate details of the Project WTGs to local and regional operators and make arrangements to publish details in ERSA for surrounding aerodromes before, during and following construction.
Aircraft collision with wind monitoring tower (WMT)	Catastrophic	Unlikely	7	Acceptable without obstacle lighting (ALARP). Although there is no obligation to do so, consideration has been made for marking the WMTs according to the requirements set out in MOS 139 Chapter 8 Division 10 Obstacle Markings, specifically 8.110 (5), (7) and (8). Communicate details of WMTs to local and regional operators and make arrangements to publish details in ERSA for surrounding aerodromes following construction.
Avoidance manoeuvring leads to ground collision	Catastrophic	Unlikely	7	Acceptable without obstacle lighting (ALARP). Communicate details of the Project WTGs and WMTs to local and regional operators and make arrangements to publish details in ERSA for surrounding aerodromes before, during and following construction.
Effect on crew	Minor	Possible	5	Acceptable without obstacle lighting (ALARP) Communicate details of the Project WTGs and WMTs to local and regional operators and make arrangements to publish details in ERSA for surrounding aerodromes before, during and following construction.
Visual impact from obstacle lights	Moderate	Likely	7	Acceptable without obstacle lighting (zero risk of visual impact from obstacle lighting). If lights are installed, design to minimise impact.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommended actions resulting from the conduct of this assessment are provided below.

Notification and reporting

1. 'As constructed' details of WGT and WMT exceeding 100 m AGL must be reported to CASA as soon as practicable after forming the intention to construct or erect the proposed object or structure, in accordance with CASR Part 139.165(1)(2).
2. 'As constructed' details of WGT and WMT coordinates and elevation should be provided to Airservices Australia, using the following email address: vod@airservicesaustralia.com.
3. Any obstacles above 100 m AGL (including temporary construction equipment) should be reported to Airservices Australia NOTAM office until they are incorporated in published operational documents. With respect to crane operations during the construction of the Project, a notification to the NOTAM office may include, for example, the following details:
 - a. The planned operational timeframe and maximum height of the crane; and
 - b. Either the general area within which the crane will operate and/or the planned route with timelines that crane operations will follow.
4. Details of the wind farm should be provided to local and regional aircraft operators prior to construction in order for them to consider the potential impact of the wind farm on their operations.
5. To facilitate the flight planning of aerial application operators, details of the Project, including the 'as constructed' location and height information of WTGs, WMTs and overhead transmission lines should be provided to landowners so that, when asked for hazard information on their property, the landowner may provide the aerial application pilot with all relevant information.

Operation

6. Whilst not a statutory requirement, the Proponent should consider engaging with any local aerial agricultural operators and aerial firefighting operators in developing procedures for such aircraft operations in the vicinity of the Project.

Marking of WTGs

7. The rotor blades, nacelle and the mast supporting the WTGs should be painted white, typical of most WTGs operational in Australia. No additional marking measures are required for WTGs.

Lighting of WTGs

8. Aviation Projects has assessed that the Project will not require obstacle lighting to maintain an acceptable level of safety to aircraft.

Marking of wind monitoring towers

9. Consideration should be given to marking the temporary and permanent WMTs according to the requirements set out in MOS 139 Section 8.10 (as modified by the guidance in NASF Guideline D). Specifically:
 - a. marker balls or high visibility flags or high visibility sleeves should be placed on the outside guy wires
 - b. paint markings should be applied in alternating contrasting bands of colour to at least the top 1/3 of the mast

- c. ensuring the guy wire ground attachment points have contrasting colours to the surrounding ground/vegetation.

Lighting of wind monitoring towers

- 10. As the WMT is lower than 150 m AGL, it will not require obstacle lighting to be fitted.

Micrositing

- 11. The potential micrositing of the WTGs and WMTs has been considered in the assessment with the estimate of the overall maximum height being based on the highest ground level within 100 m of the nominal WTG and WMT positions. Providing the micrositing is within 100 m of the WTGs and WMTs is likely to not result in a change in the maximum overall blade tip height of the Project. No further assessment is likely to be required from micrositing and the conclusions of this AIA would remain the same.

Overhead transmission line

- 12. Overhead transmission lines and/or supporting poles that are located where they could adversely affect aerial application operations should be identified in consultation with local aerial application operators and marked in accordance with Part 139 MOS 2019 Chapter 8 Division 10 section 8.110 (7) and section 8.110 (8).

Triggers for review

- 13. Triggers for review of this risk assessment are provided for consideration:
 - a. prior to construction to ensure the regulatory framework has not changed
 - b. following any significant changes to the context in which the assessment was prepared, including the regulatory framework
 - c. following any near miss, incident or accident associated with operations considered in this risk assessment.

ANNEXURES

1. References
2. Definitions
3. CASA regulatory requirements – Lighting and Marking
4. Risk Framework

ANNEXURE 1 – REFERENCES

References used or consulted in the preparation of this report include:

- Airservices Australia
 - Aeronautical Information Package; effective 13 June 2024
- Civil Aviation Safety Authority
 - Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (CAR)
 - Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (CASR)
 - CASR Part 139 (Aerodromes) Manual of Standards 2019, dated 13 March 2024
 - CASR Part 173 Manual of Standards– Standards Applicable to Instrument Flight Procedure Design, version 1.8, dated March 2022
 - Advisory Circular (AC) 91-10 v1.1: *Operations in the vicinity of non-controlled aerodromes*, dated November 2021
 - Advisory Circular 139.E-01 v1.0—Reporting of Tall Structures , dated December 2021
 - Advisory Circular (AC) 139.E-05 v1.0 Obstacles (including wind farms) outside the vicinity of a CASA certified aerodrome
- Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, Australian Government
 - National Airport Safeguarding Framework, Guideline D *Managing the Risk of Wind Turbine Installations (Wind Farms)/Wind Monitoring Towers* dated June 2013
- International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
 - Doc 8168 Procedures for Air Navigation Services—Aircraft Operations (PANS-OPS)
 - Annex 14—Aerodromes
- OzRunways
 - aeronautical navigation charts extracts, dated 4 July 2024
- Standards Australia
 - ISO 31000:2018 *Risk management – Guidelines*.

ANNEXURE 2 – DEFINITIONS

<i>Term</i>	<i>Definition</i>
Aerial Agricultural Operator	Specialist pilot and/or company who are required to have a commercial pilot's licence, an agricultural rating and a chemical distributor's licence
Aerodrome	A defined area on land or water (including any buildings, installations, and equipment) intended to be used either wholly or in part for the arrival, departure, and surface movement of aircraft.
Aerodrome facilities	Physical things at an aerodrome which could include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. the physical characteristics of any movement area including runways, taxiways, taxilanes, shoulders, aprons, primary and secondary parking positions, runway strips and taxiway strips; b. infrastructure, structures, equipment, earthing points, cables, lighting, signage, markings, visual approach slope indicators.
Aerodrome reference point (ARP)	The designated geographical location of an aerodrome.
Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP)	Details of regulations, procedures, and other information pertinent to the operation of aircraft
Aeronautical Information Publication En-route Supplement Australia (AIP ERSA)	Contains information vital for planning a flight and for the pilot in flight as well as pictorial presentations of all licensed aerodromes
Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (CASR)	Contain the mandatory requirements in relation to airworthiness, operational, licensing, enforcement.
Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC)	Meteorological conditions expressed in terms of visibility, distance from cloud, and ceiling, less than the minimum specified for visual meteorological conditions.
Manual of Standards (MOS)	The means CASA uses in meeting its responsibilities under the Act for promulgating aviation safety standards
National Airports Safeguarding Framework (NASF)	The Framework has the objective of developing a consistent and effective national framework to safeguard both airports and communities from inappropriate on and off airport developments.
Obstacles	All fixed (whether temporary or permanent) and mobile objects, or parts thereof, that are located on an area intended for the surface movement of aircraft or that extend above a defined surface intended to protect aircraft in flight.

<i>Term</i>	<i>Definition</i>
Runway	A defined rectangular area on a land aerodrome prepared for the landing and take-off of aircraft.
Safety Management System	A systematic approach to managing safety, including organisational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures.

ANNEXURE 3 – CASA REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS – LIGHTING AND MARKING

In considering the need for aviation hazard lighting and marking, the applicable regulatory context was determined.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) regulates aviation activities in Australia. Applicable requirements include the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (CAR), Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (CASR) and associated Manual of Standards (MOS) and other guidance material. Relevant provisions are outlined in further detail in the following section.

Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998, Part 139—Aerodromes

CASR 139.165 requires the owner of a structure (or proponents of a structure) that will be 100 m or more above ground level to inform CASA. This must be given in written notice and contain information on the proposal, the height and location(s) of the object(s) and the proposed timeframe for construction. This is to allow CASA to assess the effect of the structure on aircraft operations and determine whether the structure will be hazardous to aircraft operations.

Manual of Standards Part 139—Aerodromes

Chapter 9 sets out the standards applicable to Visual Aids Provided by Aerodrome Lighting.

Section 9.30 provides guidance on Types of Obstacle Lighting and Their Use:

1. *The following types of obstacle lights must be used, in accordance with this MOS, to light hazardous obstacles:*
 - a. *low-intensity;*
 - b. *medium-intensity;*
 - c. *high-intensity;*
 - d. *a combination of low, medium or high-intensity.*
2. *Low-intensity obstacle lights:*
 - a. *are steady red lights; and*
 - b. *must be used on non-extensive objects or structures whose height above the surrounding ground is less than 45 m.*
3. *Medium-intensity obstacle lights must be:*
 - a. *flashing white lights; or*
 - b. *flashing red lights; or*
 - c. *steady red lights.*

Note CASA recommends the use of flashing red medium-intensity obstacle lights.

4. *Medium-intensity obstacle lights must be used if:*
 - a. *the object or structure is an extensive one; or*

- b. the top of the object or structure is at least 45 m but not more than 150 m above the surrounding ground; or
- c. CASA determines in writing that early warning to pilots of the presence of the object or structure is desirable in the interests of aviation safety.

Note For example, a group of trees or buildings is regarded as an extensive object.

- 5. For subsection (4), low-intensity and medium-intensity obstacle lights may be used in combination.
- 6. High-intensity obstacle lights:
 - a. must be used on objects or structures whose height exceeds 150 m; and
 - b. must be flashing white lights.
- 7. Despite paragraph (6) (b), a medium-intensity flashing red light may be used if necessary, to avoid an adverse environmental impact on the local community.

Sections 9.31 (8) and (9) provide guidance on obstacle lighting specific to wind farms:

- 8. Subject to subsection (9), for wind turbines in a wind farm, medium-intensity obstacle lights must:
 - a. mark the highest point reached by the rotating blades; and
 - b. be provided on a sufficient number of individual wind turbines to indicate the general definition and extent of the wind farm, but such that intervals between lit turbines do not exceed 900 m; and
 - c. all be synchronised to flash simultaneously; and
 - d. be seen from every angle in azimuth.

Note: This is to prevent obstacle light shielding by the rotating blades of a wind turbine and may require more than 1 obstacle light to be fitted.

- 9. If it is physically impossible to light the rotating blades of a wind turbine:
 - a. the obstacle lights must be placed on top of the generator housing; and
 - b. a note must be published in the AIP-ERSA indicating that the obstacle lights are not at the highest position on the wind turbines.
- 10. If the top of an object or structure is more than 45 m above:
 - a. the surrounding ground (ground level); or
 - b. the top of the tallest nearby building (building level); then the top lights must be medium-intensity lights, and additional low-intensity lights must be:
 - c. provided at lower levels to indicate the full height of the structure; and
 - d. spaced as equally as possible between the top lights and the ground level or building level, but not so as to exceed 45 m between lights.

Advisory Circular 139.E-01 v1.0—Reporting of Tall Structures

In Advisory Circular (AC) 139.E-01 v1.0—Reporting of Tall Structures, CASA provides guidance to those

authorities and persons involved in the planning, approval, erection, extension or dismantling of tall structures so that they may understand the vital nature of the information they provide.

Airservices Australia has been assigned the task of maintaining a database of tall structures. RAAF and Airservices Australia require information on structures which are:

- a) 30 metres or more above ground level—within 30 kilometres of an aerodrome; or
- b) 45 metres or more above ground level elsewhere for the RAAF, or
- c) 30 m or more above ground level elsewhere for Airservices Australia.

The purpose of notifying Airservices Australia of these structures is to enable their details to be provided in aeronautical information databases and maps/charts etc used by pilots, so that the obstacles can be avoided.

The proposed WTGs must be reported to Airservices Australia. This action should occur once the final layout after micro-siting is confirmed and prior to construction.

International Civil Aviation Organisation

Australia, as a contracting State to the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and signatory to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Convention), has an obligation to implement ICAO's standards and recommended practices (SARPs) as published in the various annexes to the Convention.

Annex 14 to the Convention — *Aerodromes, Volume 1*, Section 6.2.4 provides SARPs for the obstacle lighting and marking of WTGs, which is copied below:

6.2.4 Wind turbines

6.2.4.1 *A wind turbine shall be marked and/or lighted if it is determined to be an obstacle.*

Note 1. — Additional lighting or markings may be provided where in the opinion of the State such lighting or markings are deemed necessary.

Note 2. — See 4.3.1 and 4.3.2

Markings

6.2.4.2 Recommendation. — *The rotor blades, nacelle and upper 2/3 of the supporting mast of wind turbines should be painted white, unless otherwise indicated by an aeronautical study.*

Lighting

6.2.4.3 Recommendation. — *When lighting is deemed necessary, in the case of a wind farm, i.e. a group of two or more wind turbines, the wind farm should be regarded as an extensive object and the lights should be installed:*

- a) to identify the perimeter of the wind farm;*
- b) respecting the maximum spacing, in accordance with 6.2.3.15, between the lights along the perimeter, unless a dedicated assessment shows that a greater spacing can be used;*
- c) so that, where flashing lights are used, they flash simultaneously throughout the wind farm;*
- d) so that, within a wind farm, any wind turbines of significantly higher elevation are also identified wherever they are located; and*
- e) at locations prescribed in a), b) and d), respecting the following criteria:*

i) for wind turbines of less than 150 m in overall height (hub height plus vertical blade height), medium-intensity lighting on the nacelle should be provided;

ii) for wind turbines from 150 m to 315 m in overall height, in addition to the medium-intensity light installed on the nacelle, a second light serving as an alternate should be provided in case of failure of the operating light. The lights should be installed to assure that the output of either light is not blocked by the other; and

iii) in addition, for wind turbines from 150 m to 315 m in overall height, an intermediate level at half the nacelle height of at least three low-intensity Type E lights, as specified in 6.2.1.3, should be provided. If an aeronautical study shows that low-intensity Type E lights are not suitable, low-intensity Type A or B lights may be used.

Note. — The above 6.2.4.3 e) does not address wind turbines of more than 315 m of overall height. For such wind turbines, additional marking and lighting may be required as determined by an aeronautical study.

6.2.4.4 Recommendation. — The obstacle lights should be installed on the nacelle in such a manner as to provide an unobstructed view for aircraft approaching from any direction.

6.2.4.5 Recommendation. — Where lighting is deemed necessary for a single wind turbine or short line of wind turbines, the installation should be in accordance with 6.2.4.3 e) or as determined by an aeronautical study.

As referenced in Section 6.2.4.3(e)(iii), Section 6.2.1.3 is copied below:

6.2.1.3 The number and arrangement of low-, medium- or high-intensity obstacle lights at each level to be marked shall be such that the object is indicated from every angle in azimuth. Where a light is shielded in any direction by another part of the object, or by an adjacent object, additional lights shall be provided on that adjacent object or the part of the object that is shielding the light, in such a way as to retain the general definition of the object to be lighted. If the shielded light does not contribute to the definition of the object to be lighted, it may be omitted.

As referenced in Section 6.2.4.3(b), Section 6.2.3.15 is copied below:

6.2.3.15 Where lights are applied to display the general definition of an extensive object or a group of closely spaced objects, and

a) low-intensity lights are used, they shall be spaced at longitudinal intervals not exceeding 45 m; and

b) medium-intensity lights are used, they shall be spaced at longitudinal intervals not exceeding 900 m.

Section 4.3 Objects outside the OLS states the following:

4.3.1 Recommendation.— Arrangements should be made to enable the appropriate authority to be consulted concerning proposed construction beyond the limits of the obstacle limitation surfaces that extend above a height established by that authority, in order to permit an aeronautical study of the effect of such construction on the operation of aeroplanes.

4.3.2 Recommendation. — In areas beyond the limits of the obstacle limitation surfaces, at least those objects which extend to a height of 150 m or more above ground elevation should be regarded

as obstacles, unless a special aeronautical study indicates that they do not constitute a hazard to aeroplanes.

Note. — This study may have regard to the nature of operations concerned and may distinguish between day and night operations.

ICAO Doc 9774 Manual on Certification of Airports defines an aeronautical study as:

An aeronautical study is a study of an aeronautical problem to identify potential solutions and select a solution that is acceptable without degrading safety.

Light characteristics

If obstacle lighting is required, installed lights should be designed according to the criteria set out in the applicable regulatory material and taking CASA's recommendations into consideration in the case that CASA has reviewed this risk assessment and provided recommendations.

The characteristics of the obstacle lights should be in accordance with the applicable standards in Part 139 MOS 2019.

The characteristics of low and medium intensity obstacle lights specified in Part 139 MOS 2019, Chapter 9, are provided below.

Part 139 MOS 2019 Chapter 9 Division 4 – Obstacle Lighting section 9.32 outlines Characteristics of Low Intensity Obstacle Lights.

1. *Low-intensity obstacle lights must have the following:*
 - a. *fixed lights showing red;*
 - b. *a horizontal beam spread that results in 360-degree coverage around the obstacle;*
 - c. *a minimum intensity of 100 candela (cd);*
 - d. *a vertical beam spread (to 50% of peak intensity) of 10 degrees;*
 - e. *a vertical distribution with 50 cd minimum at +6 degrees and +10 degrees above the horizontal;*
 - f. *not less than 10 cd at all elevation angles between –3 degrees and +90 degrees above the horizontal.*

Note: The intensity requirement in paragraph (c) may be met using a double-bodied light fitting. CASA recommends that double-bodied light fittings, if used, should be orientated so that they show the maximum illuminated surface towards the predominant, or more critical, direction of aircraft approach.

2. *To indicate the following:*
 - a. *taxiway obstacles;*
 - b. *unserviceable areas of the movement area; low-intensity obstacle lights must have a peak intensity of at least 10 cd.*

Part 139 MOS 2019 Chapter 9 Division 4 – Obstacle Lighting section 9.33 outlines Characteristics of Medium Intensity Obstacle Lights.

1. *Medium-intensity obstacle lights must:*

- a. be visible in all directions in azimuth; and
 - b. if flashing – have a flash frequency of between 20 and 60 flashes per minute.
2. The peak effective intensity of medium-intensity obstacle lights must be $2\,000 \pm 25\%$ cd with a vertical distribution as follows:
 - a. for vertical beam spread – a minimum of 3 degrees;
 - b. at -1-degree elevation – a minimum of 50% of the lower tolerance value of the peak intensity;
 - c. at 0 degrees elevation – a minimum of 100% of the lower tolerance value of the peak intensity.
3. For subsection (2), vertical beam spread means the angle between 2 directions in a plane for which the intensity is equal to 50% of the lower tolerance value of the peak intensity.
4. If, instead of obstacle marking, a flashing white light is used during the day to indicate temporary obstacles in the vicinity of an aerodrome, the peak effective intensity of the light must be increased to $20\,000 \pm 25\%$ cd when the background luminance is 50 cd/m² or greater.

Visual impact of night lighting

Annex 14 Section 6.2.4 and Part 139 MOS 2019 Chapter 9 are specifically intended for WTGs and recommends that medium intensity lighting is installed.

Generally accepted considerations regarding minimisation of visual impact are provided below for consideration in this aeronautical study:

- To minimise the visual impact on the environment, some shielding of the obstacle lights is permitted, provided it does not compromise their operational effectiveness;
- Shielding may be provided to restrict the downward component of light to either, or both, of the following:
 - such that no more than 5% of the nominal intensity is emitted at or below 5 degrees below horizontal; and
 - such that no light is emitted at or below 10 degrees below horizontal;
- If a light would be shielded in any direction by an adjacent object or structure, the light so shielded may be omitted, provided that such additional lights are used as are necessary to retain the general definition of the object or structure.
- If flashing obstacle lighting is required, all obstacle lights on a wind farm should be synchronised so that they flash simultaneously; and
- A relatively small area on the back of each blade near the rotor hub may be treated with a different colour or surface treatment, to reduce reflection from the rotor blades of light from the obstacle lights, without compromising the daytime visibility of the overall WTG.

Marking of WTGs

ICAO Annex 14 Vol 1 Section 6.2.4.2 recommends that the rotor blades, nacelle and upper 2/3 of the supporting mast of the WTGs should be painted a shade of white, unless otherwise indicated by an aeronautical study.

It is generally accepted that a shade of white colour will provide sufficient contrast with the surrounding environment to maintain an acceptable level of safety while lowering visual impact to the neighbouring residents.

Wind monitoring towers

The details of the WMT were introduced in **Section 4** of this report.

Consideration could be given to marking any WMTs according to the requirements set out in Part 139 MOS 2019 Chapter 8 Division 10 Obstacle Markings; specifically:

8.110 Marking of Hazardous Obstacles

(5) As illustrated in Figure 8.110 (5), long, narrow structures like masts, poles and towers which are hazardous obstacles must be marked in contrasting colour bands so that the darker colour is at the top; and the bands are, as far as physically possible, marked at right angles along the length of the long, narrow structure; and have a length ("z" in Figure 8.110 (5)) that is, approximately, the lesser of: 1/7 of the height of the structure; or 30 m.

(7) Hazardous obstacles in the form of wires or cables must be marked using 3-dimensional coloured objects attached to the wire or cables. Note: Spheres and pyramids are examples of 3-dimensional objects.

(8) The objects mentioned in subsection (7) must:

- (a) be approximately equivalent in size to a cube with 600 mm sides; and*
- (b) be spaced 30 m apart along the length of the wire or cable.*

NASF Guideline D suggests consideration of the following measures specific to the marking and lighting of WMTs:

- the top 1/3 of wind monitoring towers to painted in alternating contrasting bands of colour. Examples of effective measures can be found in the Manual of Standards for Part 139 of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998. In areas where aerial application operations take place, marker balls or high visibility flags can be used to increase the visibility of the towers
- marker balls or high visibility flags or high visibility sleeves placed on the outside guy wires
- ensuring the guy wire ground attachment points have contrasting colours to the surrounding ground/vegetation **or**
- a flashing strobe light during daylight hours.

Temporary WMTs installed prior to WTG installation and WMTs not in close proximity to a WTG should be lit with medium-intensity steady red obstacle lighting at the top of the WMT mast. Characteristics of medium-intensity obstacle lighting is contained in MOS 139, Section 9.33.

7.1.1. AC139.E-05

AC139.E-05 provides guidance on matters that should be considered when assessing a wind farm development and other tall structure so that all necessary measures can be taken to protect aviation safety. Wind farms and monitoring towers (turbine installations) and other tall structures may pose a safety risk to aviation due to their physical characteristics, size and location. Mitigation measures such as warning lights and reporting of tall structures that are at least 100m AGL, are also described.

2.5 Aviation hazard lighting - International best practice

2.5.1 This section describes the science behind aviation hazard lighting.

2.5.2 Australian regulations state that aircraft in uncontrolled airspace may operate under visual flight rules (VFR), which requires the pilot to remain clear of clouds and to adhere to visibility minima. CAR 172 and CAR 174 and the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) ENR 1.2 prescribe the following requirements:

- in Class G airspace below 3000 ft Above Mean Sea Level (AMSL) or 1000 ft AGL (whichever is the higher) – remain clear of cloud with minimum visibility of 5000 m.
- in Class G airspace below 10 000 ft AMSL (subject to the above) – remain 1000 ft vertically and 1500 m horizontally from cloud and with 5000 m visibility.

Note: Helicopters may be permitted to operate in lower visibility and that further exemptions may apply to special cases such as military, search and rescue, medical emergency, agricultural and fire-fighting operations.

2.5.3 ICAO Annex 14, Volume 1, Chapter 6.2 states that obstacles penetrating navigable airspace (which starts at the minimum flight altitude of 500 ft (152.4 m) AGL) outside of a built-up area, should be equipped with 2000 candela medium intensity obstacle lights.

2.5.4 2000 candela medium intensity obstacle lighting recommendation satisfies the 5000 m VFR visibility requirements, according to practical exercises undertaken by the FAA and documented in AC 70/7460-1L (FAA, 2015).

2.5.5 In Australia, CASA has accepted the use of 200 candela lighting in some circumstances due to a lack of back lighting in rural and remote areas, meaning that a lower intensity light is still visible to pilots at an acceptable distance to permit a pilot to see and avoid the obstacle.

2.6 Hazard lighting

2.6.1 This section describes the reasoning behind CASA's preference to recommend aviation hazard lighting for tall structures and aircraft detection systems for wind farms.

2.6.2 Hazard lighting for wind farms and other tall structures is intended to alert pilots, flying at low altitude, to the presence of an obstacle allowing them sufficient awareness to safely navigate around or avoid it. The pilot is responsible for avoiding other traffic and obstacles based on the "alerted" see-and-avoid principle.

2.6.3 Unless the wind farm or tall structure is located near an airport, it is not expected to pose a risk to regular public transport operations. The kind of air traffic that is usually encountered at low altitude in the vicinity of a wind farm or tall structure includes light aircraft (e.g., private operators, flight schools, sport aviation, agricultural, survey, and fire spotting and control) and helicopters (military, police, emergency services, survey, and fire spotting and control). Hazard lights are therefore designed to provide pilots with sufficient awareness about the presence of the structure(s), so they can avoid it. This means that the intensity of the hazard lights should be such that the acquisition distance is sufficient for the pilot to recognise the danger, take evasive action and avoid the obstacle by a safe margin in all visibility conditions. This outcome considers the potential speed of an aircraft to determine the distance by which the pilot must become aware of the obstacle to have enough time and manoeuvrability to avoid it.

It is Aviation Projects' assessment, via the Risk Assessment conducted, that there will be an acceptable level of aviation safety risk associated with the potential for an aircraft collision with the Project WMT without obstacle lighting on the WMT.

Overhead transmission lines

Overhead transmission lines and/or supporting poles that are located where they could adversely affect aerial application operations should be identified in consultation with local aerial application operators and marked in accordance with Part 139 MOS 2019 Chapter 8 Division 10 section 8.110 (7) and section 8.110 (8):

8.110 Marking of hazardous obstacles

(7) Hazardous obstacles in the form of wires or cables must be marked using 3-dimensional coloured objects attached to the wire or cables. Note: Spheres and pyramids are examples of 3-dimensional objects.

(8) The objects mentioned in subsection (7) must:

- (a) be approximately equivalent in size to a cube with 600 mm sides; and*
- (b) be spaced 30 m apart along the length of the wire or cable.*

ANNEXURE 4 – RISK FRAMEWORK

A risk management framework is comprised of likelihood and consequence descriptors, a matrix used to derive a level of risk, and actions required of management according to the level of risk.

The risk assessment framework used by Aviation Projects has been developed in consideration of ISO 31000:2018 *Risk management—Guidelines* and the guidance provided by CASA in its Safety Management System (SMS) for Aviation guidance material, which is aligned with the guidance provided by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in Doc 9589 *Safety Management Manual*, Third Edition, 2013. Doc 9589 is intended to provide States (including Australia) with guidance on the development and implementation of a State Safety Programme (SSP), in accordance with the International SARPs, and is therefore adopted as the primary reference for aviation safety risk management in the context of the subject assessment.

Section 2.1 of the ICAO Doc 9589 *The concept of safety* defines safety as follows [author's underlining]:

2.1.1 Within the context of aviation, safety is “the state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of property damage is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification and safety risk management.”

Likelihood

Likelihood is defined in ISO 31000:2018 as the chance of something happening. Likelihood descriptors used in this report are as indicated in Table 1.

Table 1 Likelihood Descriptors

No	Descriptor	Description
1	Rare	It is almost inconceivable that this event will occur
2	Unlikely	The event is very unlikely to occur (not known to have occurred)
3	Possible	The event is unlikely to occur, but possible (has occurred rarely)
4	Likely	The event is likely to occur sometimes (has occurred infrequently)
5	Almost certain	The event is likely to occur many times (has occurred frequently)

Consequence

Consequence is defined as the outcome of an event affecting objectives, which in this case is the safe and efficient operation of aircraft, and the visual amenity and enjoyment of local residents.

Consequence descriptors used in this report are as indicated in Table 2.

Table 2 Consequence Descriptors

No	Descriptor	People Safety	Property/Equipment	Effect on Crew	Environment
1	Insignificant	Minor injury – first aid treatment	Superficial damage	Nuisance	No effects or effects below level of perception
2	Minor	Significant injury – outpatient treatment	Moderate repairable damage – property still performs intended functions	Operations limitation imposed. Emergency procedures used.	Minimal site impact – easily controlled. Effects raised as local issues, unlikely to influence decision making. May enhance design and mitigation measures.
3	Moderate	Serious injury – hospitalisation	Major repairable damage – property performs intended functions with some short-term rectifications	Significant reduction in safety margins. Reduced capability of aircraft/crew to cope with conditions. High workload/stress on crew. Critical incident stress on crew.	Moderate site impact, minimal local impact, and important consideration at local or regional level, possible long-term cumulative effect. Not likely to be decision making issues. Design and mitigation measures may ameliorate some consequences.
4	Major	Permanent injury	Major damage rendering property ineffective in achieving design functions without major repairs	Large reduction in safety margins. Crew workload increased to point of performance decrement. Serious injury to small number of occupants. Intense critical incident stress.	High site impact, moderate local impact, important consideration at state level. Minor long-term cumulative effect. Design and mitigation measures unlikely to remove all effects.
5	Catastrophic	Multiple Fatalities	Damaged beyond repair	Conditions preventing continued safe flight and landing. Multiple deaths with loss of aircraft	Catastrophic site impact, high local impact, national importance. Serious long-term cumulative effect. Mitigation measures unlikely to remove effects.

Risk matrix

The risk matrix, which correlates likelihood and consequence to determine a level of risk, used in this report is shown in Table 3.

Table 3 Risk Matrix

		CONSEQUENCE				
		INSIGNIFICANT 1	MINOR 2	MODERATE 3	MAJOR 4	CATASTROPHIC
LIKELIHOOD	ALMOST CERTAIN 5	6	7	8	9	10
	LIKELY 4	5	6	7	8	9
	POSSIBLE 3	4	5	6	7	8
	UNLIKELY 2	3	4	5	6	7
	RARE 1	2	3	4	5	6

Actions required

Actions required according to the derived level of risk are shown in Table 4.

Table 4 Actions Required

8-10	Unacceptable Risk	Immediate action required by either treating or avoiding risk. Refer to executive management.
5-7	Tolerable Risk	Treatment action possibly required to achieve As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) - conduct cost/benefit analysis. Relevant manager to consider for appropriate action.
0-4/5	Broadly Acceptable Risk	Managed by routine procedures and can be accepted with no action.



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